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Regional and local public debt has grown in importance on international capital markets in 
recent decades. This development has mainly been due to wider progress in budgetary 
decentralisation in many advanced and emerging economies over the period, in conjunction 
with increased investor demand for this type of debt [see Canuto and Liu (2013)].
Spanish government has been no exception to this trend. Specifically, Spain’s autonomous 
regions have regularly accessed the financial markets, in a process paralleling the transfer 
of budgetary authority that has been under way since the country’s transition to democracy.1 
Between 1995 and 2007, Spanish autonomous regions’ total debt2 averaged around 6% 
of GDP. Half of this was in the form of debt securities and the rest in that of loans from 
resident and non-resident entities.
The economic and financial crisis that broke in 2007 caused a sharp deterioration in public 
finances affecting most countries and government sub-sectors. In the specific case of Spain’s 
autonomous regions, debt more than doubled between 2007 and 2011, rising from 5.7% to 
13.6% of GDP. The financial stress caused by the sovereign-debt crisis in the euro area from 
2010 onwards made it particularly difficult for the autonomous regions to tap the financial 
markets. At the same time, they significantly extended the time taken to pay their suppliers.3 
State intervention was ultimately necessary to alleviate this situation, with successive 
extraordinary measures and additional liquidity support mechanisms for the autonomous 
regions being put in place in 2012. These instruments took the form of bilateral loans from 
central government to the autonomous regions. Thus, in 2015 Q3, 45% of autonomous-
region debt (which then stood at 23.6% of GDP) was in the form of loans from central 
government, in contrast to a negligible level prior to 2012,4 such that this became the main 
means of covering the funding requirements of the autonomous regions as a whole.
The mechanisms currently operate through the “Fondo de Financiación a Comunidades 
Autónomas” (Autonomous region financing fund), created on 1 January 2015, enabling the 
low financing costs currently enjoyed by the Spanish Treasury to be passed on to the 
autonomous regions. Nevertheless, keeping this fund indefinitely raises the question of 
what the permanent system for meeting the autonomous regions’ financing requirements 
should be, particularly given the existence of a framework of budgetary discipline rules, 
such as those established in the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability (LOEPSF).
Introduction
1  Article 157 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that the autonomous regions may finance themselves with 
debt. The Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous regions (LOFCA) implements this mandate, imposing 
certain limitations on the autonomous regions’ long-term debt, in particular, requiring prior authorisation from 
central government.
2  Debt measured according to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). For more on the definition of public debt in 
the EDP, see the Banco de España methodological note at: http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/htmls/
notamet_pde.pdf.
3  Spain’s recent experience is by no means an isolated case internationally. Sub-central governments have faced 
bouts of financial difficulties in the past, which have in some cases been remedied by central government 
intervention [Inman (2010) or Feibelman (2012)].
4  For an analysis of trends in public debt in Spain and its determinants during the economic crisis, see Gordo, 
Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2013) and Delgado, Gordo and Martí (2015).
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This article aims to review the essential points found in the specialised literature and 
international experience on the subject of how sub-central governments’ financing needs 
are met. It therefore describes the basic features of the recent global process of increased 
fiscal decentralisation, and reviews international experience with mechanisms of access to 
securities markets by sub-national governments, with a view to putting the Spanish case 
in context and drawing possible lessons.
Debt issues by local and regional governments have generally grown in significance in 
international financial markets in recent years. There is little uniformity, however, at the 
international level, in terms of the weight of sub-central debt in the economy as a whole and 
as a share of total government debt, as Chart 1 shows. Moreover, there are also differences 
in the way countries are organised into local and regional governments. The chart shows 
regional and local debt as a share of GDP (see upper panel) and relative to total government 
debt (lower panel) in a group of developed countries in 2007 and 2014, using Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data. In Spain’s case, the ratio of sub-
central debt to GDP in 2014 was higher than that in some countries organised along federal 
lines, such as the United States, Switzerland or Germany. After Germany, Spain has the 
euro area’s largest share of this type of debt in its total government debt.
According to the specialised literature, one of the main factors driving this upward trend in 
sub-central debt in recent decades has been the global process of budgetary 
decentralisation. This has led many countries, both advanced and emerging, to transfer a 
growing share of spending and tax raising powers to sub-central government levels, and 
it has made it possible in practice to take on debt by issuing debt securities on financial 
markets. In particular, rapid urbanisation in emerging countries has driven large-scale 
infrastructure projects, which it has been necessary to finance from the markets [Canuto 
and Liu (2010 and 2013)].
Decentralisation processes have also tended to be asymmetric as regards spending and 
revenue-raising powers, which, in “soft” budgetary constraint scenarios5 may have 
encouraged sub-central governments to take on more debt than they would have done if 
there were more shared fiscal responsibility between government sub-sectors. In this 
regard, Chart 2 shows how the degree of decentralisation of public expenditure 
responsibilities (represented on the horizontal axis) has been higher than that of revenues 
(regional and local, taken as a whole) for which they have regulatory capacity6 (on the 
vertical axis), for OECD member countries as a whole, for which comparable 2011 data are 
available. This reflects the fact that the points on the chart lie to the right of the main 
diagonal, even for the main federal countries, such as Canada, Switzerland, the United 
States and Germany. The chart also shows how that year Spain also had one of the highest 
levels of decentralisation of the 26 countries considered, viewed from both the sub-central 
expenditure and revenues viewpoint, ranking sixth in both cases.
A second driver of increased recourse to debt security issues by sub-central governments 
has been the way the market for this type of debt has developed [see Canuto and Liu 
(2010 and 2013)]. This trend, which has been particularly visible in emerging countries, has 
enabled a diversification away from traditional funding sources for sub-central debt, such 
Regional and local debt 
in the international context
5  The specialised literature refers to a situation in which a sub-central level of government adopts fiscally 
irresponsible policies because it builds in expectations of a central government bail-out as “soft budgetary 
constraint”. For more details and a discussion of the experience in Spain, see Fernández et al. (2013).
6  Revenues over which sub-central governments have regulatory authority as a proportion of total government 
revenues, against total sub-central government expenditure as a ratio of total government expenditure.
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as bank loans. The development of new mechanisms of market access, such as project 
finance vehicles or special purpose vehicles (SPV) has also contributed. However, in most 
countries, recourse to bank loans (or central government) remains the dominant alternative. 
This is illustrated by Chart 3, showing data on the breakdown of regional and local debt 
into securities and loans, for a group of European countries for which uniform data are 
available. In Germany, Spain, Belgium and Austria, regional governments financed 
themselves through both loans and securities issues, the former being more significant in 
all cases except Germany, where around 60% of debt was obtained from capital markets. 
Bank finance predominated in the case of local government. Finland, Norway and Sweden 
have a higher relative volume of securities than the other countries. This is related to the 
existence of local funding agencies that are able to aggregate the borrowing requirements 
of numerous local government bodies to enable larger bond issues. The following section, 
SOURCE: OECD.
a Total liabilities consolidated only within each sector (Central, including Social Security and Central government, Regional and Local), i.e. central govt. and the 
social security fund are consolidated with one another, but regional and local govt. are only consolidated with themselves. United States, Switzerland and Japan, 
not consolidated due to lack of data.
b 2012 data used for 2014 due to lack of data.
c 2013 data used for 2014 due to lack of data.
d Only sum of regional and local data available.
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which describes the commonest means sub-central levels of government use to access 
market funding in developed economies, looks closer at this issue.
There are a series of common elements that determine market access capacity and 
conditions for sub-central administrations, such as issuer size and institutional framework. 
In this respect, one major determinant is whether or not the country has fiscal rules that set 
targets and limits for debt or other budgetary indicators. The role of central government as 
a guarantor (or not) for issues is another important factor, and in particular, whether there 
is a “no bail-out” clause. Clauses of this kind aim to avoid the cost of one government 
subsector’s fiscal irresponsibility being passed on to the rest and are essential to ensure 
that the capital market keeps discipline by differentiating between government sub-sectors 
in terms of their risk premiums. Finally, having a credit rating is usually a requirement for 
market access. This imposes information requirements to promote standardisation and to 
meet the market’s demands for more information transparency.
Sub-central governments’ 
mechanisms for accessing 
markets on the 
international level
SOURCE: OECD.
a ISO 3166 standard country coding.
b Sum of government expenditure over total consolidated government expenditure (excluding transfers between government levels). No consolidated data 
available for Australia, Japan or Iceland.
c Sub-national revenues over which there is discretionary power.
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The way in which these elements are effectively combined determines the make-up of the 
issue mechanisms, which also differ in terms of the debt issuer’s level of individual 
responsibility. First of all, it is possible to distinguish those cases in which regions or other 
sub-central bodies are able to issue individually and so are subject to a higher level of 
market discipline. Secondly, there are others that make joint issues, either at the same 
level of government or otherwise, such that a large part of the risk is pooled. Lastly, there 
are those cases in which central government assumes all the risk of the issue, for example 
when it taps the market for funds that, in turn, it channels towards sub-central governments, 
or when it guarantees issues by the latter.
The first group, in which sub-national governments issue debt directly, includes the cases 
of the United States, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany in particular. The United 
States presents one of the largest and most active sub-national debt markets, where the 
municipal bond market includes bonds issued by the states, municipalities and other 
government entities, such as publicly owned ports and airports. There is a wide variety of 
securities, in terms of types and yields,7 and bankruptcy is only possible in the case of 
local governments.8 Canada’s provinces also have a long tradition of issuing debt on 
markets. In 2014, 25% of total private and public long-term bonds were issued by the 
provinces, slightly more than the federal government, which accounted for 23%.9 As in 
the case of the United States, debt issues by Canadian provinces are not backed by the 
federal government [see Joffe (2012)]. In Belgium, where there are several interconnected 
levels of government, all regions and communities are authorised to issue debt and 
habitually tap the markets, although they require central government authorisation. In 
Switzerland, each sub-national government is responsible for its own debt. In the case of 
Germany, the federal states (Länder) usually issue bonds on the capital markets 
individually.
As regards the second group or type of issues described above, joint issues have also 
been common in Germany, involving either groups of Länder (to issue bonds known as 
Jumbos10) or the Länder and the federal government (through Bund-Länder-Bonds11). 
Joint issues also include those involving local financing agencies, which are specialist 
credit institutions for local bodies, part-owned by municipalities, and sometimes by central 
government. There is a long history of this type of agency in the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark, where they date back furthest (created in 1898), and they 
usually have a high credit rating. Along similar lines, France and the United Kingdom have 
recently set up local financing agencies.12 In France, Dexia’s bankruptcy meant the loss of 
the largest lender to local authorities, making creating a local agency a way of keeping 
 7  Other common types of bonds include general obligation bonds (GOs, for short), where both the principal and 
interest are guaranteed by the issuer’s credit and tax-raising capacity, and revenue bonds, which are paid with 
income generated by a specific project, such as tolls.
 8  The Municipal Insolvency Act (Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code) was passed by Congress in 1937 in response 
to the numerous municipal bankruptcies during the Great Depression. Although bankruptcies of local authorities 
have been relatively rare, the case of the city of Detroit in July 2013 stands out. See Canuto and Liu (2013) and 
Cuadro (2013) for examples of local- and state-government crisis resolution in the United States.
 9  Report by the Ontario Securities Commission: “The Canadian Fixed Income Market 2014.”
10  To date, 49 joint issues have been carried out, with varying numbers of states involved in each. The participants 
are usually between five and seven of the smaller Länder (in terms of size or population) although there have 
been issues in which a larger number of Länder have taken part, such as that in 1997, which had ten participants. 
The volume of Jumbo issues has usually been significantly higher than that of issues by individual Länder.
11  These bonds first came on the market in June 2013. This was a joint issue by ten states (with a share of 86.5% 
of the total issued) and the federal government. This issue obtained the maximum rating from Fitch (AAA), i.e. 
the same rating as the federal government [Unicredit (2013)].
12  The Agence France Locale was created in late 2013 and is 100% owned by a total of 91 local authorities. In the 
United Kingdom, the Municipal Bonds Agency was proposed as an independent agency in 2014. Outside 
Europe, for example in New Zealand, the New Zealand Government Funding Agency was set up in 2011.
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local authorities’ access to finance open. Outside Europe there are institutions of this kind 
in Canada, Japan and the United States.
Lastly, in some countries central government taps the markets to subsequently provide 
funds to sub-central governments, typically as bilateral loans. One example is that of 
Austria’s Länder, which are authorised to access the market directly, but can also ask the 
“Federal Financing Agency” to tap the markets for them and subsequently make loans to 
each individual Land. This category could include those countries that have public financial 
institutions equivalent to a development bank to finance sub-national government projects, 
such as the KFW group in Germany13 or Kommunalkredit in Austria (99.8% owned by the 
federal government).
In Spain’s case, the system in effect until early 2012 was that of direct issuance on the 
markets, with no explicit central-government guarantee.14 With the implementation of 
extraordinary measures and the additional liquidity support mechanisms incorporated in 
LOEPSF in April 2012, however, the current system is one in which it is mainly central 
government that taps the markets for funds and then channels them to the autonomous 
regions as loans. Although LOEPSF includes a “no bail-out” clause (Article 8), under which 
the State will not be answerable for the commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities 
or their linked or dependent bodies,15 it does allow sub-national governments to apply to the 
State for access to these measures and mechanisms, in which case the law explicitly includes 
strict conditions on the budgetary activities of the sub-national government concerned.
The following section reviews the impact of the crisis on the autonomous regions’ access 
to debt markets post-2012 in order to give a view of the reasons for the transition from one 
system for meeting borrowing requirements to another. 
As Chart 4 shows, since the start of Economic and Monetary Union the weight of securities 
and loans in total autonomous region debt remained stable at around 3% of GDP in both 
cases until late 2008. Thereafter, the volumes of both loans (excluding loans from other 
government subsectors) and securities rose significantly, stabilising in 2012. Chart 5 
shows the annual volume of debt issues by the autonomous regions as a whole (see upper 
panel) and the annual number of issues (see lower panel) over the period 1995-2015. The 
chart shows the increase in volumes issued as a result of the economic crisis, and the 
subsequent reduction, as from 2012, in the average size and number of issues, this 
reduction occurring despite the autonomous regions’ rising debt levels. However, it is 
worth noting that the aggregate figures shown in Chart 5 are consistent with considerable 
heterogeneity among the autonomous regions, with some regions issuing large volumes 
and others not issuing any debt on the markets during the period shown (see Chart 7).
The change in trend observed in 2012 is a reflection of central government’s response to 
the autonomous regions’ market access difficulties during the crisis and the high funding 
The impact of the crisis 
on the autonomous 
regions’ access 
to the markets
13  Created after the Second World War to channel Marshall Plan funds. Ownership is currently divided between 
the federal government (80%) and the Länder (20%). It finances specific housing, education and environment 
programmes. Its issues are fully guaranteed by the federal government.
14  Under Organic Law 3/2006 of 26 May 2006, reforming Organic Law 5/2001 of 13 December 2001 complementing 
the additional provision of the General Budgetary Stability Law.
15  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. Also, 
under LOEPSF, autonomous regions are not answerable for local authorities’ debts (or those of their dependent 
or linked bodies), without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects 
jointly. This drafting is similar to that in the Treaty on European Union describing relationships between Member 
States (Article 125 of the consolidated version of treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For more detailed information, see Chapter 13 of the Boletín Estadístico, http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/bolest13.html.
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costs they faced on their bond issues (see Chart 7). During the year central government 
set up a number of extraordinary financing measures,16 such as the supplier payment 
fund, to pay outstanding commercial debt, and the regional liquidity fund (FLA).17 The FLA 
was created to address autonomous regions’ debt maturities and obtain the resources 
needed to fund the borrowing they were allowed under the stability regulations.18 These 
were extraordinary liquidity support measures, and so originally intended to be temporary. 
The autonomous regions can access these funds voluntarily, and the funds made payments 
associated with their functions directly. This made central government a creditor to the 
autonomous regions, as the sums paid turned into long-term debts. Specifically, over the 
three years it has been in force, the FLA has disbursed a total of €62,773 million (6% of 
2014 GDP),19 of which 60% has been used to pay debt and interest maturities directly.
SOURCES: Directorate General of the Treasury and Financial Policy, Banco de España, National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), Bolsas y Mercados
Españoles, official journals of the autonomous regions, and Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas.
a Effective marginal rates on new issues.
b Weighted average yield of autonomous regions' issues.
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16  For a more detailed description, see Delgado, Hernández de Cos, Hurtado and Pérez (2015).
17  Created by Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 of 13 July 2012 on liquidity measures for General Government.
18  Subsequently, however, it was used to pay suppliers [see Delgado, Hernández de Cos, Hurtado and Pérez (2015)].
19  “Informe sobre los mecanismos de las CCAA. Balance 2012-2014” [Report on autonomous region mechanisms. 
2012-2014 balance sheet] Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.
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From the outset, taking part in the FLA meant accepting budgetary conditions in return for 
access to finance. Member autonomous regions had to draw up an adjustment plan 
requiring individual debt and deficit targets be met, and that the sums owing be repaid. 
Stricter reporting requirements were also imposed, in particular with the requirement for 
enhanced monthly information on the progress of budgetary outturn and treasury, and its 
impact on compliance with the adjustment plan. Within the scope of this programme, 
control and monitoring measures for the plans were strengthened, such that, for example, 
central government could withhold a given autonomous region’s payments on account 
under the regional funding system in the event of non-payment of the FLA.
In 2015 these extraordinary funds were turned into the “regional financing fund”, which, 
along with giving continued support to autonomous regions facing liquidity difficulties, 
added the objective that sub-national governments be able to benefit from the lower 
borrowing costs enjoyed by central government.20 The fund is sub-divided into three sub-
funds. The first sub-fund is equivalent to the former FLA, and retains its name. This fund is 
highly conditional, and membership is obligatory upon those autonomous regions that 
belonged to the former FLA and did not meet their budgetary stability, public debt and 
average supplier payment delay targets. The second fund is the Financial Facility, aimed at 
autonomous regions that are meeting their targets. And finally, the Social Fund, which is 
intended to pay autonomous regions’ obligations to local authorities as a result of 
agreements on social spending. Five autonomous regions belong to the new FLA: 
Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, Murcia and Valencia. The other autonomous 
regions in the common system (i.e. excluding the “foral” (specific-status) communities of 
the Basque Country and Navarre) belong to the Financial Facility, while the specific-status 
communities have decided not to join.
The varying degree of autonomous regions’ participation in the financing mechanisms up 
until the end of 2014 has also resulted in differences in their ability to access capital 
markets. As is clear from Chart 7, which shows the autonomous regions with the greatest 
issuing activity, those regions taking part in the original FLA (Andalusia, Catalonia and 
Valencia) strongly reduced issuance from 2011 to 2014 to small amounts of debt or no 
debt at all, while those that did not take part (Madrid, Galicia and the Basque Country on 
the chart) maintained similar or higher levels than in 2011 between 2012 and 2014, 
reflecting high levels of public debt to refinance in more recent years. Finally, issues as a 
whole dropped in 2015, probably as a result of the implementation of the new regional 
financing fund, which all the regions in the common system have joined.21
Going forward, given the exceptional nature of the system and its intended role in boosting 
liquidity, the autonomous regions can be expected to gradually converge over the medium 
term on a system in which they again play a more active role in raising funds on capital 
markets. As mentioned above, the Spanish framework includes a central government “no 
bail-out” clause, which is necessary to ensure the potential market discipline effect, and 
when autonomous regions apply to access these measures and mechanisms, they are 
subject to conditions. The extension of these mechanisms over time highlights the need 
20  Royal Decree-Law 17/2014 of 26 December 2014, on financial sustainability measures for the autonomous 
regions and local government bodies and other economic measures. The fund “implements new mechanisms 
allowing financial savings to be shared between levels of government, prioritising attention to social spending, 
continuing to assist governments with greatest financing difficulties, and boosting those that have managed to 
overcome them.”
21  The Madrid region continued issuing in the first half of the year, until it decided to join the regional financing 
fund, receiving its first payment under the fund in August that year.
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for the explicit conditionality components to be applied strictly to the budgetary actions of 
the governments concerned so as to prevent these support mechanisms from leading to 
inappropriate budget policies [Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2015)].
Additionally, given that markets do not always operate efficiently, and in some circumstances 
their role in deterring inappropriate fiscal policies can be small [see Lane (1993)], the 
Spanish framework also includes a set of budgetary rules setting limits on the ability of the 
various levels of government to produce fiscal imbalances. In particular, LOEPSF sets 
limits on the public deficit (budgetary equilibrium in structural terms), an expenditure 
control rule, and explicit objectives on the level of public debt.22 LOEPSF also includes 
mechanisms enabling central government to oversee and monitor sub-central finances in 
detail, along with preventive and corrective mechanisms for any imbalances that arise 
from the preventive or corrective point of view [for more details, see Hernández de Cos 
(2011) and Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2013)]. These mechanisms have been bolstered 
by the creation of the “Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility” (AIReF), whose 
main remit is to ensure the principle of budgetary discipline is adhered to.
The fiscal rules in the stability law aim to achieve two purposes: enable sufficient room for 
manoeuvre ex ante to avoid fiscal crises arising, and defining the criteria for ex post 
correction of budgetary imbalances if they ultimately arise. In the case of the latter, the 
correction mechanism needs to be applied rigorously when imbalances arise if the rule is 
to be effective. As regards the ex ante margins, the possibility of designing reserve funds 
with regular contributions during periods of economic prosperity could be studied. This 
instrument (referred to as a “rainy day fund”) is used in many of the states of the United 
States, where it seems to be associated with a better credit rating [see Charles (2010) and 
Hernández de Cos and Pérez (2015)]. Finally, there is evidence that it is important for there 
to be a close relationship between income and expenditure powers in order to maintain 
fiscal discipline among sub-central governments [Rodden (2002)]. Therefore, from this 
point of view, it may be appropriate to strengthen the autonomous regions’ joint fiscal 
responsibility, although transferring taxes alone is insufficient to guarantee fiscal discipline 
and avoid the problem of soft budgetary constraint that may arise otherwise.23
18.2.2016.
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